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How homogenous are the sources of human motivation?  Textbook Humeans 
hold that every human action is motivated by desire, thus any heterogeneity derives 
from differing objects of desire.  Textbook Kantians hold that although some human 
actions are motivated by desire, others are motivated by reason.  This conflict has no 
substance until one has settled on an understanding of the key terms—‘desire, ‘reason’, 
‘source’, and ‘motivation’—each of which is itself a battleground.  One question that has 
arisen in this vicinity concerns whether there is any overlap between cognitive and 
conative states, i.e., whether there are states such that to be in one is at once (and 
indivisibly) to take the world to be a certain way and to be motivated to act.  This is the 
state-question.  My question here is different: not whether cognitive and conative states 
are necessarily distinct, but whether passion and reason constitute fundamentally 
distinct sources of human motivation.  This is the source-question.  In what follows. I 
argue for an affirmative answer to the source-question while remaining neutral on the 
state-question.  I adopt a posture of neutrality not because of any uncertainty as to its 
answer,1 but in order to show that recourse to this answer is not required to defend a 
(broadly) Kantian picture of human motivation.  
I begin by isolating (in section one) one source of human motivation: orectic 
desires, which are associated with the appetites and, more broadly, pleasure.  Anorectic 
 
1 I defend the affirmative answer in Marcus 2012, ch. 2 and Marcus 2018. 
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desires, which are associated with judgments of the good, are another plausible source 
of human motivation.  I argue that the two sorts of desires constitute distinct sources of 
motivation initially on the basis of their differing epistemological profiles.  Specifically, 
self-attributions of anorectic desires are governed by the transparency condition, self-
attributions of orectic desires are not.  It emerges from this discussion (in sections two 
and three) that the motivation for performing an action arises in very different ways 
from each sort of desire.  This difference, in turn, is explained (as I show in section four) 
by their differing relations to the will.  Roughly, an orectic desire influences the will, but 
an anorectic desire is the will.  And the motivation associated with an anorectic desire 
derives just from the determination that the relevant action is to-be-done—from reason. 
 
I.  Framing the Issue 
 
 Progress on the source-question depends on being careful with the term ‘desire’.  
One might try to formulate it this way: “Are we motivated to act by anything other than 
desire?”  But this won’t do, since there is a broad and a narrow use of ‘desire’, on the 
first of which the answer is a trivial ‘no’.  But it will take work to bring the contrast 
between these uses into view.  And we must be careful as we do to keep the state- and 
source-questions separated.  Furthermore, there are various categories of desire that are 
crucial for understanding the structure of human agency, but which are not relevant to 
the source-question at all.  Sorting all of this out requires a section of its own. 
 T.M. Scanlon contrast broad and narrow senses of ‘desire’ in the following 
passage:  
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‘Desire’ is sometimes used in a broad sense in which the class of desires is 
taken to include any “pro-attitude” that an agent may have toward an 
action or outcome, whatever the content or basis of this attitude may be. 
Desires in this sense include such things as a sense of duty, loyalty, or 
pride, as well as an interest in pleasure or enjoyment. It is 
uncontroversial that desires in this broad sense are capable of moving us 
to act, and it is plausible to claim that they are the only things capable of 
this, since anything that moves us (at least to intentional action) is likely 
to count as such a desire…. A substantial thesis claiming a special role for 
desires in moving us to act would have to be based on some narrower 
class of desires, which can be claimed to serve as independent sources of 
motivation and perhaps also of reasons to act.2 
 Scanlon’s point is borne out by the fact no prominent defender of a (broadly) 
Kantian view of human agency would deny that, whenever someone acts, it is possible to 
explain their so acting by saying something along the lines of “S is x-ing because she 
wants ___”.   For example, even as John McDowell defends the Kantian view that moral 
requirements are unconditional, he insists that in “construing obedience to a categorical 
imperative as acting for a certain sort of reason, we can see the obedience as a case of 
doing what one wants.”3  Part of his point is that the source of such a desire is reason, 
since it is “consequential on” the subject’s holding a view of how things are—a “state or 
 
2 Scanlon 1998, 3. 
3 McDowell 1998, 25. 
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disposition of one’s cognitive equipment”.4  Thus, to do what one wants (in the broad 
sense) is not necessarily to be motivated by the passions.   
 McDowell, then, holds that the answer to the source-question is ‘yes’.  But in the 
essay from which those remarks are drawn, the state-question is front and center: a 
cognitive state, McDowell urges, can also and inseparably be a conative state.  Michael 
Smith famously demurs, advancing against McDowell (among others) a theory of desire 
(in the broad sense) according to which it is marked by a ‘mind to world’ direction of fit 
and which contrasts with belief, marked by a ‘world-to-mind’ direction of fit.  His 
central point is that “…what Humeans must deny and do deny is simply that agents who 
are in belief-like states and desire-like states are ever in a single, unitary, kind of state. 
This is the cash value of the Humean doctrine that belief and desire are distinct 
existences.”5  This way of replying to McDowell, whatever its intrinsic merits, sidesteps 
the source-question.  For even if one were to answer the state-question in the negative 
on the basis of Smith’s analyses of desire (in the broad sense) and belief, there would 
remain the question of whether the passions and reason constitute distinct sources of 
motivation.   
Smith’s argument for the Humean doctrine “is really quite simple.  It is that it is 
always at least possible for agents who are in some particular belief-like state to the 
effect that their Φ-ing is right to none the less lack any desire-like state to the effect that 
 
4 McDowell 1998, 18 
5 Smith 1994, 119 
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they Φ.”6  One might then connect the state-question and the source-question as follows.  
A belief is never the source of motivation, because desire (in the broad sense) to Φ is 
both necessary and sufficient for the motivation to Φ.  But from the (purported) fact that 
no desire (in the broad sense) can be a belief, it doesn’t follow that the source of the 
motivation to Φ is the passions, rather than reason.  On the Kantian view I envision, the 
source of the motivation to perform some actions is desire (in a narrow sense), the 
motivational source of other actions is belief.  But this position leaves open the 
possibility that the answer to the state-question is ‘no’, that there is no single state that 
is both a desire and a belief. 
We have, then, a broad use of ‘desire’, which is, in the words of Philippa Foot, “a 
use of 'desire' which indicates a motivational direction and nothing more.”7  To have a 
desire in this sense, says Thomas Nagel, “simply follows from the fact that [the relevant] 
considerations motivate me”8  These are Davidson’s ‘pro-attitudes’.9  This use contrasts, 
as I’ve said, with a narrower one.  G.F. Schueler calls desires in the narrow sense 
“desires proper;”10 I use the expression ‘orectic desire’.  ‘Desire’ is employed in the 
narrow sense when we say that it is “possible for me to do things that I have no desire to 
 
6 Smith 1994, 119. 
7 Foot 1979, 149. 
8 Nagel 1970, 29.   
9 See Davidson 1980. 
10 Schueler 1995, 35. 
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do.”11  In its extension falls “hunger, thirst and the rest”, whereas the broad sense 
includes “moral and political beliefs”.12  The argument to follows turns on an account of 
the distinction between orectic desire and what I call anorectic desire.  For the moment, 
I will use Schueler’s formula to anchor our grasp of orectic desire.  When we say that 
someone did something despite having no desire to do it, we are using ‘desire’ in the 
orectic sense.  We might also put the idea this way: when we desire (orectically) to Φ, we 
feel like Φ-ing, and how much we feel like Φ-ing corresponds to the strength of the 
desire.    
Since my concern here is with the ultimate source or sources of our motivation to 
act, I will ignore in what follows desires that borrow their power to motivate from 
sources further upstream.  Among those derivative sources of motivation are 
instrumental desires: those that we possess only because their satisfaction is a means to 
satisfying a further desire.  For example, I might go to the store to buy a bag of Cheetos.  
My desire to go to the store is instrumental insofar as doing so is a means to buy 
Cheetos.  Another derivate source is what Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder call 
 
11 Schueler 1995, 33. 
12 Schueler 1995, 34. In a similar vein, Christine Korsgaard holds that “animal actions 
and human actions involve the interaction of two factors, an incentive and a principle.  
The incentive is a motivationally loaded representation of an object” (Korsgaard 2009, 
109).  Korsgaard’s incentives correspond (roughly) to desires in the broad sense.  She 
too holds that the genus is not exhausted by orectic desire: “Desires and inclinations are 
incentives; so is respect for the moral law” (Korsgaard 1996, 165). 
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realizer desires.13  Realizer desires are those that we possess because their satisfaction 
satisfies a (more general) desire in a specific way, e.g., for example, my desire to buy 
that bag of Cheetos realizes my desire to buy a bag of Cheetos.  Instrumental and 
realizer desires are motivated in Nagel’s sense: they “are arrived at by decision and after 
deliberation”.  An orectic desire is unmotivated—they “simply come to us.”14  A plausible 
candidate for the ultimate source of desire in our example is an orectic desire to eat 
Cheetos, which (we can suppose) is neither instrumental nor realizes another desire.   
One point of this essay is to show that there is a kind of desire—anorectic desire—
that is like instrumental and realizer desires in being motivated, but unlike them insofar 
its power to motivate is original.  For example, the desires to be a good friend, to bring 
peace to the Earth, and to live justly, are (often) not held in virtue of their conduciveness 
to some further desire.  But, unlike orectic desire, they do not simply come to us.  We 
can arrive at them by deliberation and decision.  The existence of anorectic desires 
makes the answer to the source-question ‘yes’.  
 
II. Orectic Desire and the Limits of Transparency 
 
 It has become a familiar (though contested) point that our knowledge of what we 
believe is, in some sense, a by-product of our determination of what’s true.  This is the 
 
13 Arpaly and Shroeder 2014. 
14 Nagel 1970, 29. 
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phenomenon of transparency.  Richard Moran explains the transparency condition this 
way: 
 I treat the question of my belief about P as equivalent to the question of 
the truth of P…. [T]he basis for this equivalence hinges on the role of 
deliberative considerations about one’s attitudes. For what the “logical” 
claim of transparency requires is the deferral of the theoretical question 
“What do I believe?” to the deliberative question “What am I to believe?” 
And in the case of the attitude of belief, answering a deliberative question 
is a matter of determining what is true.15 
 Is there, one might wonder, a similar dimension to our knowledge of what we 
desire?  Moran holds that the same point does hold of at least some desires: 
Thomas Nagel… distinguishes between “motivated” and “unmotivated” 
desire... When someone wants to change jobs, or learn French, or avoid 
being seen, these are “motivated” or “judgment-sensitive” desires in that 
they depend on certain beliefs about what makes these various things 
desirable…It is the normal expectation of the person, as well as a rational 
demand made upon him, that the question of what he actually does 
desire should be dependent in this way on his assessment of the desire 
and the grounds he has for it…In fact, by far most of the desires we act 
upon are of this sort, and not of the sort that simply assail us with their 
 
15 Moran 2001, 62-63. 
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force (despite the traditional concentration by philosophers since Plato 
on the “brute” desires of hunger and lust).16  
 I too concentrate on what Moran calls here brute desires (taking consolation in 
the pedigree of this misguided focus), but I find his epistemology of motivated desires 
compelling.  He holds that by considering the question of what is to-be-desired, I can 
determine an answer to the question of what I do desire.  Do I want to go to the store?  
Yes, since I need some Cheetos for my salad.  I determine that my need for Cheetos 
makes a trip to the store to-be-desired, and my knowledge of my desire to go to the store 
is part and parcel of making that determination.  When I say “I want to go to the store” I 
am speaking from the first-person point of view, as the desire’s author.  But according to 
Moran, we have no way to get inside our orectic desires: 
The person’s stance toward such desires, and how he deals with them, 
may be little different from his stance toward any other empirical 
phenomenon he confronts. From this angle, a brute desire is a bit of 
reality for the agent to accommodate, like a sensation, or a broken leg, or 
an obstacle in one’s path.17  
Moran thus argues that the transparency condition does not hold for orectic desires.  
Alex Byrne disagrees.  He describes a pattern of inference, “if φ-ing is a desirable 
option, believe that you want to φ,” and argues that knowledge of one’s desires is 
 
16 Moran 2001, 115-116.   
17 Moran 2001, 115. 
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typically obtained by trying to follow it.  Byrne’s approach to transparency is 
importantly different from Moran’s.  For Moran, one’s knowledge of what one desires 
(where the desire is motivated) is explained by the fact that the desire is constituted by 
one’s determination of what is to be wanted.  Our desire itself, as well as our knowledge 
of it, reflects deliberative activity or agency.  Thus, for Moran, the fact that we are 
passive in relation to our unmotivated desires puts them outside the scope of 
transparency.  For Byrne, the question of what constitutes one’s desire is irrelevant to its 
epistemology.  All that matters is that “[o]ne’s desires tend to line up with one’s 
knowledge of the desirability of the options” (19).  Thus, the inference from φ-ing’s 
being desirable to its being the object of one’s desire is a pretty good one.  Agency and 
activity have nothing to do with it. 
 But Moran is right about orectic desires.  To show the error in Byrne’s approach, I 
will elaborate on one of his examples.  Suppose I arrive, hungry, at an Indian restaurant.  
I scan the menu.  Many of the dishes are familiar to me, a few are not.  I wonder what to 
order.  Various kinds of considerations might be brought to bear.  Perhaps I am 
reviewing the restaurant, or on a date, or trying to impress my boss, or avoiding carbs, 
or on a strict budget, etc.  But suppose instead that I am visiting the city for a day from 
an Indian food desert and have dropped in alone in order to have a great Indian meal 
with no other concerns to detract from the experience.  Still, I can’t eat everything, and 
so I must choose.  What do I want (or most want)?  And how exactly, do I go about 
answering this question?  And how, after I’ve ordered, do I determine that I’ve made a 
mistake, i.e., ordered the wrong dish?  And where precisely do we locate the mistake? 
 It might seem as if “what do I want?” is not a real question at all.  Dennis Stampe 
dismisses it: 
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But our so-called decisions as to "what we want" are really decisions 
about what we will have, or what we will do. When I make up my mind 
that "what I want" is the fish and not the fowl, I am really deciding that I 
will have the fish.18 
But this is wrong.  The question addressed to myself is a real question, one that is often 
difficult to answer.  “What am I in the mood for?”, “What will hit the spot?”, “Savory or 
Sweet?”, “How much spice?”  The thread running through these questions is their 
answerability to my own pleasure.  I am trying to figure out what I will enjoy (or enjoy 
the most).  
 Aristotle is helpful here.  He describes desire as “the craving for pleasure,”19 and 
suggests a plausible account of how I figure out what I want.  I use the imagination—
‘phantasia’—so as to “concretely envisag[e] candidate courses of action”, as Hendrik 
Lorenz puts it.20  Jessica Moss describes the motivational role of such imaginings as 
follows: “pleasurable phantasia induces desire and pursuit, just as would the actual 
pleasurable perception.  Phantasia’s key contribution to action is its pleasurable 
representation of an object not presently perceived, which thereby becomes desired as a 
goal.”21    
 
18 Stampe 1987, 370. 
19 Aristotle 350, 18-27. 
20 Lorenz 2006, 127. 
21 Moss 2012, 62. 
 12 
We can begin to think through this idea by returning to our example.  Suppose 
that the prospect of eating lamb biryani is what most excites me, and so I order one.  “I 
really want a lamb biryani”.  The dish arrives and it tastes exactly the way that lamb 
biryani should and just the way I remember it tasting.  But I don’t enjoy it.  Here are two 
possible descriptions of the case.  I did really want a lamb biryani even though eating 
one did not please me.  I merely thought I wanted a lamb biryani.  It is the latter, I find, 
that makes the best sense of the way that we approach the question of what we desire.  
In the case at issue, I am trying to think of what would (most) please me.  Insofar as I 
fail to identify it, I have arrived at the wrong answer to the question “what do I want?”.  
If what I would actually enjoy (most) is something other than the biryani, then the 
answer to “what I do desire (most)?” is not the biryani. 
Once we move from ordering food to weightier decisions, the substance and 
difficulty of this question become even more striking.  Consider an undergraduate 
pondering what career path to pursue.  There are likely many factors in play aside from 
their own career satisfaction: what their parents want them to do, what would be most 
useful to society, what is most prestigious, most lucrative, and so forth.  But they surely 
should also consider what they themselves want—in this case, what they would find 
most fulfilling.  (The notion of pleasure that figures in our characterization of orectic 
desires is an expansive one; this is not a doctrine worthy of swine.)  Perhaps they have 
narrowed it down: poet or philosopher.  But which one?  The answer can be very hard to 
know.  They will attempt to concretely envisage possible careers in each field, finding 
motivation in their own reaction to their imagined prospects.  But the capacity of a 
student to imagine concretely what it might be like for them to be a poet or a 
philosopher is very limited.  And the problem is not just that they might lack 
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information about the life of the poet and the philosopher.  It is also a problem of self-
knowledge: which sort of world and work would they find most rewarding?  This is hard 
to know.  One is often surprised at the way one responds to a situation in reality, even if 
one has imagined it accurately.    
The transparency condition does not apply to orectic desire because I am in the 
picture when it comes to the question of what I desire (orectically) in a way that I am 
not when it comes to the question of what I believe.  There is no doxastic analogue to my 
own pleasure.  To know what I believe, I can typically simply consider the way the world 
is.  Sometimes the proposition in question concerns me, but this is because of the 
specific content of this belief and not its form, i.e., not because of what it is to be a belief.  
Belief is in this sense impersonal.  But my feelings help to determine the facts about 
what I desire (orectically), and this connection characterizes the form of orectic desire.   
Byrne raises a worry about his own view.  Recall that he is defending the idea that 
one knows what one wants by looking ‘outwards’.  The worry is that to know the 
desirability of an option, we must look ‘inwards’, even if not to our own desires:   
[A]lthough one’s own desires are not among the features that make for 
the desirability of an option, one’s other mental states sometimes are. For 
instance, I might well conclude that I want to go to the Indian restaurant 
partly on the basis of the fact that I like Indian food: I like, say, andar 
palak and plain naans….[B]ut the considerations [raised earlier] indicate 
that the epistemology of likings should be in the same world-to-mind 
style. And initially, that is not at all implausible: if I sample andar palak 
for the first time, and someone asks me if I like it, I turn my attention to 
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its flavor. Does it taste good or bad? There is little reason to think that 
this involves investigating my own mind, as opposed to the andar palak 
itself.22 
When I consider whether I want the biryani, my answer to the question is informed by 
whether or not I like it.  Byrne sees this, but holds that the question of whether I like it is 
transparent to the question of whether it tastes good.  He concludes that my knowledge 
of whether I want the palak is based on thinking about the world and not myself.  But 
this does not follow.  The way that I react to the prospect of eating it is not determined 
by whether I imagine that it will taste good to competent judges or most people, but 
whether I expect it to taste good to me.  When I decide in favor of the biryani, it is 
precisely in anticipation of the pleasure eating it will give me.  And that is part of what it 
is to imagine that it will taste good.  When I say what I want to eat (understood to isolate 
the relevant orectic desire), I aim to cite a food that will in fact please me, will taste good 
to me.  If I choose it and it is what I imagined it would be, but I do not enjoy it, then it is 
evidently not what I desired—not something whose tasting good (to me) justified my 
ordering it. 
My point is not that to know our orectic desires we must look inward.  That 
would be to conflate them with mere sensations.  Like pain, orectic desires are passive in 
the sense that they typically come upon us unbidden.  Unlike pain, however, the identity 
of a specific desire is constituted in part by the way I would respond to the world around 
 
22 Byrne 2011, 27-28.  I would argue that my basic objection to Byrne also applies to the 
view advanced in Fernández 2007. 
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me.  Whether it is a fact that I want the biryani or the palak depends upon which I would 
enjoy (most).  Unlike my own pain, I cannot know this on the basis of an inward glance, 
i.e., purely phenomenologically.  The way that I know my orectic desires is through the 
imagination: I gauge my desire by imagining the pleasure I would (or wouldn’t) take in 
performing the relevant action.  
 So far I have focused on orectic desires that concern myself and my own pleasure, 
but they need not.  I might enroll my daughters in a certain after-school program 
because I think it will improve their hand-eye coordination.  The explanation might be 
expanded in the following direction.  The thought of their being uncoordinated is painful 
to me and this induces an aversion to this outcome that serves as the motivation for my 
decision to enroll them.  Orectic desires, furthermore, might concern no one at all.  I 
might simply find amusing the idea of my old belt buckle buried in a ditch at the bottom 
of the Grand Canyon where no one will ever find it.  These are orectic desires, even 
though my reason for performing the relevant actions is not my own pleasure.  Still, my 
own pleasure in contemplating the desired result—pleasure felt in anticipation of that 
result—motivates me to perform the action.  And if the result is just as I envisioned but 
its actuality does not please me, it is evidently not what I desired. 
In the philosophy of action, the term ‘motivation’ is often used to refer to a 
rationale for action, to a goal or reason or desire. In ordinary contexts, another use is 
common.  When we speak of someone ‘lacking motivation’, we don’t mean that they are 
unaware of a rationale for pursuing the relevant course of action.  We are motivated to 
perform an action, in the relevant sense, if we feel like doing it.  Consider, e.g., Billy, 
who, at eighteen years old, is floundering scholastically.  He knows, having heard it 
many times, that his mother “didn’t get to be a partner at Skadden Arps by sleeping 
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through classes, smoking weed, and half-assing [her] homework”.  He wishes to have 
her life as an adult but simply cannot get himself to do the things he knows are 
necessary.  He doesn’t feel like doing then.  He lacks motivation sufficient to overcome 
his adolescent torpor.  Nor can he muster the self-command required to overcome his 
apathy—a topic we will return to below. 
Motivation, in this sense, is not an all or nothing matter.  Competitive athletes are 
in general motivated to win.  But they famously use even remotely diminishing 
comments made by their opponents as motivation.  Such comments neither give them a 
new goal nor create motivation ex nihilo.  Rather ‘bulletin board material’ gives them 
something to focus on that will drive them to pursue a goal they already (know they) 
have with greater intensity.   
The source-question, recall, is whether passion and reason constitute distinct 
sources of motivation of human action.  I hold that when an agent acts on an orectic 
desire, the source of the motivation for performing it is the passions.  She does what she 
feels like doing.  Suppose I am Φ-ing, where my desire to Φ is orectic.  You ask: “Why 
are you Φ-ing?”.  I say: “Because p.”  There are various sorts of possible substitution 
instances for p:  Cheetos taste good.  My kids will become more coordinated.  It would 
be so cool!  My desire’s being orectic entails that I feel like eating the Cheetos/enrolling 
my kids in the program/burying my belt buckle.  The pleasure I feel in the 
contemplation of performing the relevant action spurs me to act.  It is an efficient cause 
of my action.  This doesn’t mean that my goal in performing it is necessarily to feel 
pleasure, i.e., to do something that I will take pleasure in doing.  Nor does it mean my 
reason for doing it is necessarily that the outcome will please me.  My reason for 
enrolling my daughters is that it will improve their hand-eye coordination.  Improving 
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their hand-eye coordination is the rational cause my enrolling them.23  But the pleasure 
I feel in anticipation of achieving the results prompts me to act.  The drive to do it is 
channeled from the pleasure I feel at the idea of doing it.  
What, then, of anorectic desire?   
 
III.  Anorectic Desire  
  
What are we saying about someone when we explain their actions by appealing to 
something that they want to do?  My point in this essay is that there are two species of 
desires, two sorts of states appeal to which shed (different sorts of) light on the 
motivational provenance of an action.  This difference is not one of content but of form.  
The sort we have considered so far, orectic desire, is the product of the passions, i.e., the 
pleasure-seeking part of the human psyche.  Now we will consider anorectic desires, the 
product of reason.   
We have said that orectic desires are characterized in part by a distinctive sort of 
uncertainty.  A statement of what one wants is vulnerable to the failure to please of the 
stated object of desire.  I am hungry.  Do I want the biryani or the palak?  To know this, I 
use my imagination.  But my imagination is not an infallible guide to my actual 
reactions.  Orectic desires are also characterized by their motivational power.  When one 
acts on the relevant desire, one is doing what one feels like doing.  The form of desire is 
linked to its supplying motivation, not in the sense that our end is to please ourselves, 
 
23 See Marcus 2012 for more on the idea of a rational cause. 
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but in the sense that feeling like doing it is itself the pleasurable contemplation of the 
idea of doing it.24   
Anorectic desires have thus far only been identified negatively: they are neither 
orectic desires, instrumental desires, nor realizer desires.  Now consider the following 
example.  Suppose you learn that I am donating fifty-thousand dollars to Doctors 
Without Borders.  “Why do you want to give so much money to them?”, you ask.  I cite 
the good work they do and the way their efforts are limited by inadequate funding.  Now 
suppose soon after I make the donation, I find myself wishing that I had the money 
back: Rick Owens has just released an irresistible, very limited-edition alligator leather 
jacket.  I freely admit to you now that I regret my decision.  But where do we locate the 
error?  
If what was at issue was an orectic desire, the fact that the ensuing action made 
me miserable would reflect a failure of self-knowledge at the time of action.  But that 
need not be so in this case.  I said that I wanted to give the 50000 to DWB and doing so 
did not please me.  This does not prove that I didn’t really want to give the money to 
DWB.  Whether or not it shows this depends on whether my motivation in making the 
donation was derived from my pleasure in contemplating it.  It may not have been.  I 
might simply have made a determination of what would be good to do.  If you were to 
 
24 This approach might also suggest the beginning of an answer to the question posed by 
Tamar Shapiro in her (2014), the question of “how we can be passive in relation to our 
own self-movement” (149).  Orectic desires are passive; but because they are a function 
of what pleases us, we identify with the actions to which they give rise. 
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say: “I guess you didn’t really want to give DWB the money after all,” I might honestly 
reply that my later regret does not reflect a failure to identify what I wanted.  I may 
simply regret that I went with my judgment of the good rather than my (orectic) desire. 
To be sure, failures of self-knowledge are certainly possible in cases where 
someone professes (what we are calling) an anorectic desire.  It is always possible that I 
am self-deceived about my motives.  And sometimes the underlying desire is not quite 
determinate, or it is determinate but hard to articulate, or hard to bring to mind because 
it is painful to do so.  More generally, any factor that can interfere with the authoritative 
self-ascription of belief can also interfere with the authoritative self-ascription of an 
anorectic desire.  Transparency holds of the latter in the same way as it holds of the 
former.  My knowledge of what I (anorectically) want is a by-product of my 
determination that it is to be done. 
Some hold theories of desire according to which they are beliefs about the good.25  
There is something to this approach, at least as it pertains to anorectic desires.  But 
since I have put to one side the state-question, I will register my limited agreement with 
this view by saying that the motivation provided by an anorectic desire has its source 
simply in the judgment that a certain action is to-be-performed.  This leaves open 
whether such judgments are identical to the relevant desires.  The crucial point in what 
remains is that the source of actions motivated by anorectic desire is reason and not 
passion.  Whereas some of our actions are motivated by the pleasure in contemplating 
their completion, others are motivated simply by the judgment that they should be 
 
25 See, e.g., Humberstone 1987, Little 1997, McNaughton 1998, and Gregory 2018. 
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performed (perhaps, to keep the distinctness possibility alive, by generating the 
anorectic desire to perform that action).  Note that this does not exclude my taking 
pleasure in the thought of the result.  Perhaps I am delighted at the thought of doctors 
equipped with the latest medical technology.  The point is rather that such pleasure is 
not an efficient cause of an action motivated by anorectic desire.  It’s not what prompts 
me to make the donation. 
It must be acknowledged, however, that anorectic motivation is puzzling in a way 
that orectic motivation is not.  There is nothing mysterious about the idea that pleasure 
can motivate.  The pleasure I take in imagining my daughters’ improved hand-eye 
coordination spurs me to do what I can to improve it.  But what, if not pleasure, 
motivates me to act on an anorectic desire? 
To answer that question, I must first bring out into the open an assumption I’ve 
made in the foregoing discussion.  It is now widely (though not universally) accepted 
that the way citing a desire (of whatever sort) helps to explain an action is by 
articulating how the agent herself conceived of things such that there was something 
worthwhile about doing it.  Something about the object of desire draws the agent, qua 
agent, in.  It draws the agent in rationally: to act on the desire is to perform the action in 
light of some feature of the action that rendered it, in the eyes of the agent, worth doing.  
This is the Guise of the Good Thesis: whatever is desired is desired under the guise of 
the good.26 
 
26 See the essays in Tenenbaum 2010 for discussion. 
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It might be wondered whether a fair adjudication of the dispute between 
Humeans and Kantians is possible under the scope of this assumption, which could be 
interpreted as stating that our motive in acting must somehow always be derived from 
reason.  But the Thesis is consistent with either answer to the source-question.  One 
might answer ‘no’—i.e., say that the source of all actions is the passions—but still 
maintain that the way orectic desires supply motivation for action is through the 
experience of finding the action worthy of being performed, an experience that makes 
one feel like performing it.  We do what we feel like doing, but always under the guise of 
the good.  This also leaves open the possible sorts of explanations of why we feel like 
doing it.  Presumably, we might feel like doing it for any number of reasons: because it 
serves our own interests or the interests of those we love or strangers, or for that matter, 
no one’s interests.  To answer ‘yes’—i.e., to say that some of our actions are motivated by 
reason—is to give metaphysical weight to the ordinary phrase ‘doing what one doesn’t 
feel like doing’. 
According to the Guise of the Good Thesis, to desire is for a course of action to 
appear worth pursuing.  But this does not exhaust the character of orectic desire, as 
Talbot Brewer emphasizes (using ‘desire’ where I use ‘orectic desire’): 
… [D]esires are best understood as consisting not just partly but wholly 
in appearances of reasons or values.  It must be noted, however, that not 
just any such appearance will constitute a desire. It is an article of 
common sense that we sometimes decide that we have good reason to do 
something, and proceed to do it, even though we have no desire 
whatsoever to do it… Desires are appearances with respect to which we 
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are in some significant measure passive. Their occurrence is not wholly 
dependent upon our active efforts to bring into view the appearances of 
goodness in which they consist, and their persistence and vividness does 
not depend entirely on our deliberate efforts to discern the putative 
goods they call to our attention.27  
I would add to this an explanation of “persistence” and “vividness” in terms of feeling.  
The motivation for pursuing what we desire (in the orectic sense) is derived from the 
pleasure we feel at the prospect of performing the action.  But we cannot complete this 
picture without adding another element to our account: the will.  In the next section, I 
will extend the foregoing analysis of the orectic-anorectic distinction by considering 
their differing relations to the will.    
 
IV.  Reason, Passion, and The Will 
 
 Warren Quinn, like Brewer, holds that orectic desire (which he also calls simply 
‘desire’) does not consist simply in the positive evaluation of an option.  He explains the 
additional feature by reference to the will: 
 I am not saying, however, that desire is in general nothing more than 
positive evaluation. In some cases we would not speak of desire if the 
implicit positive evaluation did not provoke or were not accompanied by 
 
27 Brewer 2009, 34. 
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some kind of appetite that prods the will toward the object for the good 
that it seems to offer….[continued in the footnote] This kind of 
motivating state--one that has influence on the will--must be 
distinguished from dispositive states of the will, forms of executive 
rationality (steadfastness, courage, prudence, and the like) or 
irrationality (distraction, cowardice, weakness, and the like) that enable 
or disable the will in its natural pursuit of the best course of action. On 
my anti-Humean conception...much rational human action comes about 
without the influence of motivational pushes and pulls. I see that it is a 
convenient time to get needed service for my car and I simply proceed to 
do it. All that is required is the perception of overall advantage (the safety 
and comfort of having a well-running car and the convenience of present 
service) and a reasonable degree of executive rationality. In such a case 
we may also speak of my desire for the advantage, but this desire is 
nothing more than my will's healthy recognition of its availability. Such a 
desire is not something the will takes account of in determining a 
rational choice. 28 
 Quinn’s understanding of the relation between passion, reason, and the will is 
instructive.  What Quinn calls “motivational pulls and pushes” is what I call feeling like 
doing it (or not).  My orectic desires prod me in one direction or another.  But my 
 
28 Quinn 1995, 168-169, fn 32. 
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anorectic desires do not prod me at all, which is to say, they do not prod my will.  We 
should say rather such desires are my will.29   
Moran, recall, links the transparency of belief to its being an exercise of the 
person’s agency.  Orectic desires are passive and so, as we saw, cannot be known simply 
by looking ‘outwards’, in the way that one might say what one believes on the basis of 
considering of what’s true.  (Again: they also cannot be known by looking ‘inward’ in the 
way that one looks ‘inward’ to answer the question: “how bad is your pain on a scale of 
one to ten?”).  Because they are passive, they are not sustained by our endorsement of 
what they portray as appealing.  To have such a desire is to find oneself drawn, say, to 
smoke a cigarette.  It is, after all, deeply satisfying to draw the smoke into one’s lungs, 
the nicotine buzz is a nice little high, and there is no better way to top off a big dinner.  
But I quit and can’t risk a relapse.  And so I resist the desire, which persists without my 
endorsement.  Orectic desire is thus, as Quinn says above, “the kind of motivating 
state…that has influence on the will.”  Orectic desires, in virtue of their connection to 
pleasure, “prods the will toward the object for the good that it seems to offer”.  To have 
the desire is to feel like performing the action.  The more we feel like it—the stronger the 
desire is—the harder it is not to do it.   
An anorectic desire, because it is active, is nothing but our endorsement.  Or, to 
abstract from the question of state-distinctness, the motivation provided by an anorectic 
desire is nothing but the motivation provided by our endorsement.  The endorsement in 
question is the judgment that a certain course of action is to-be-done.  The judgment is 
 
29 Cf., Schueler 1995, 33 and Brewer 2009 35.  
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identical to or is the source of the desire.  In the ordinary case, to make the judgment is 
thereupon (perhaps because of the generation of a distinct desire-state) to possess the 
motivation.  And were I to abandon the judgment, I would cease to possess the 
motivation.  To change my mind is for the action to cease to be my anorectic desire, to 
cease to be my will. 
This pertains to a point Schueler makes: whereas (to use my terminology) a 
stronger orectic desire outweighs a (weaker) competing orectic desire, an anorectic 
desire overrides a competing orectic desire.30  To say that it overrides rather than 
outweighs is to say that, from the point of view of the relevant judgment of to-be-done-
ness, the weight of the desire is irrelevant.  When I act on an orectic desire, I am giving 
myself over to the pursuit of an end that I feel like pursuing (prompted by the pleasure I 
derive from the contemplation of its completion).  To have a conflicting anorectic desire 
is to judge that an incompatible course of action should be pursued instead regardless of 
how much I feel like doing it.  Failure to act on an orectic desire where one follows 
instead a different orectic desire reflects the weakness of the former desire in 
comparison to the latter.  Failure to act on an orectic desire where one follows instead 
one’s judgment of what to do does not necessarily reveal anything about the strength of 
the orectic desire.  It shows only the strength of one’s will.  An anorectic desire is a 
judgment of what one’s will should be, one that in the ideal case thereby becomes one’s 
will.  Hence the failure to act on one’s judgment of to-be-done-ness shows weakness of 
the will.  And success in overcoming temptation shows will power. 
 
30 Schueler 1985, 33. 
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Kant holds that “the will is nothing other than practical reason.”31 A full account 
and defense of this claim is not possible here.  Nor, for that matter, is this paper an 
attempt to interpret or defend the historical figure.  But Kant’s remark is 
(unsurprisingly) suggestive of the framework in which we can best make sense of 
anorectic desires as states of the will.  The basic thought is that reason, in its practical 
orientation, is our ability to determine what to do, i.e., to answer the question “what 
should I do?”.  And, furthermore, our answer to this question, in paradigmatic cases, 
just is a state of the will.  In other words, my answer to the question of what I should do 
is neither simply a belief that I ought to Φ, nor a belief about that I will Φ, but is at once 
both a judgment and, in paradigmatic cases, an action.  Aristotle puts this by saying that 
practical reasoning concludes in action, a doctrine that has many contemporary 
defenders.32  My practical reasoning culminates in a practical judgment—an exercise of a 
cognitive power—to the effect that Φ-ing is to be done, and that judgment is the agent’s 
Φ-ing, assuming the time to act is at hand, the world cooperates, there is no defect in the 
will, and so forth.33  
But if this framework is required to make sense of anorectic motivation, then it 
seems the source- and state-questions are not separable after all. The state question is 
whether there are states that are at once conative and cognitive.  And no slogan 
 
31 Kant 1787, 4:412.   
32 See, e.g., Anscombe 2000, Davidson 1980, Rödl 2007, Tenenbaum 2007, Thompson 
2008, McDowell 2010, and Fix 2018. 
33 Cf., Fix 2018, 28. 
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encapsulates an affirmative answer better than ‘action is the conclusion of practical 
reasoning’.  But we can yet tease apart the two issues.  Practical reasoning, we can say, 
concludes in a judgment that provides motivation to act.  In some cases, this motivation 
stems simply from our own endorsement of the action as what is to be done.  That is, 
when our motivation for performing an action is an anorectic desire, we are motivated 
to perform the action simply because it is what we should do (or so we judge).  Whatever 
effort is required to do it is sustained by this determination, i.e., by the will.  Thus, the 
source of the motivation provided by anorectic desire is practical reason itself. 
It will be no doubt be objected here that I’ve made things easy on myself by 
discussing only cases in which there is a conflict between orectic and anorectic desires.  
What of cases in which someone orectically desires to do what they also judge is to be 
done?  This, at least on an Aristotlean view, is the scenario that typifies the life of the 
fully virtuous person: the phronomos.  The phronomos is pleased at the prospect of 
comforting a friend instead of going to the movies.34  Where, then, does the motivation 
to provide her action come from: passion or reason? 
The answer is ‘passion’.  The phronomos is motivated by the happy prospect of 
consoling a friend in need.  Unlike the enkratic agent, the phronomos does not need will 
power to overcome her orectic desire to see the movie.  But this answer is misleading for 
at least two reasons.  First, her will stands ready to pick up any motivational slack left by 
her affections (albeit slack that, since she is a phronomos, will never be left).  Second 
and more importantly, to say that she is motivated by passion rather than reason might 
 
34 See McDowell 1998, essays two and three, and Hursthouse 2006. 
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wrongly suggest that her affective make-up is not itself an aspect of her practical 
rationality.  It is.  The phronomos arrives at her affective dispositions only after passing 
through an enkratic phase, one in which her passions are not yet aligned with reason.  
Will power is, in other words, required to achieve a state in which one can act as one 
should without relying on will power.  The passions, then, themselves ideally have a 
rational shape: they are structured by an understanding of how to act and so motivate 
one to do what one should.  And the passions of the phronomos are also the product of 
her acting on anorectic desires.  But still, insofar as our concern is the structure of 
human motivation—specifically, the source-question—we distinguish between actions 
that stem from the passions and those that stem (directly) from the will itself, i.e., from 
reason.  Someone whose passions are not fully rational can still do what they should, but 
doing so requires motivation provided by reason.   
 
Conclusion   
 
I am under no illusion that this discussion amounts to an impregnable case for a 
(broadly) Kantian answer to the source-question.  I do hope, first, to have shown that 
the source-question can be assessed independently of the much-more-frequently-
debated state-question, a fact that is striking insofar as the interest in the latter is 
derived chiefly from the former.  Second, the differing epistemology of orectic and 
anorectic desires is itself prima facie evidence for their being separate species of desire 
(in the broad sense).  Third, their epistemological differences are neatly explained by an 
independently plausible conception of their differing relations to the will.  The resultant 
picture supports the ‘yes’ answer to the source-question.   
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Among the many issues that will have to be addressed going forward is this one:  
We can be wrong about what we desire.  No one contests that.  But if my account is 
correct, we can be wrong about what we want (orectically) in a way that is generally not 
acknowledged: viz., by failing to know what would please one.  This suggests a 
complication for a widely held view of the relation between desire and action.  On that 
picture, common to Kantians and Humeans alike, if I am Φ-ing intentionally I must 
want to Φ in the broad sense of ‘want’.  But what about when I order the biryani, only to 
find out later that, in fact, I didn’t want it—a case, in other words, where I misidentify 
what would please me?  I didn’t order it because I wanted it; after all, I didn’t want it.  In 
this scenario, someone Φs intentionally without wanting to Φ even in the broad sense.  
This strikes me not as a bullet to be bitten or dodged, but as a potentially fruitful 
vantage point from which to reexamine the way desires influence us.  Paradigmatically, 
in Φ-ing one follows through on a desire to Φ.  But that is because in the paradigmatic 
case, one fully occupies the point of view of a motivating desire.  This point of view is 
characterized, in the orectic case, by finding it pleasurable in prospect to do something 
and thereby to be motivated to do it.  Someone who does not have this sort of knowledge 
of their orectic desire (as in the case under discussion) is not acting on it; their desire 
does not rationally explain their behavior in the ordinary sense.  An analogous point 
holds of our beliefs and, by extension, our anorectic desires.  If one does not have the 
right sort of knowledge of one’s belief that p—if one is, for example, alienated from the 
belief—it cannot rationalize one’s action, though of course it might influence our 
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behavior in other ways.35  A desire (of whatever sort) rationally explains action only if it 
is fully integrated into the agents’ self-conscious conception of the world upon which she 
acts.36 
  
 
35 See Marcus and Schwenkler (2020) for discussion of this phenomenon.   
36 Thanks to Keren Gorodeisky, Arata Hamawaki, Doug Lavin, Ram Neta, and an 
anonymous referee at this journal for helpful comments and discussion.   
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